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The Political Economy Approach to 
Food Systems Reform*
Olivier De Schutter1
Abstract The political economy approach to food systems steers away both 
from approaches that focus on biogeochemical flows and the embeddedness 
of food systems in the biosphere, and from classical economists’ approaches 
that address the role of prices in relating supply and demand. This article 
discusses what is specific to the political economy analysis, which places 
power at the centre of its inquiry; and it lists the challenges this approach 
faces in its attempt to contribute to the reform of food systems.
Keywords: food systems, political economy, entitlements approach, 
right to food, governance.
1 Introduction
A political economy approach to food systems is one that places actors, 
and the power relationships between them, at the heart of  its analysis. 
In Section 2, I provide an interpretation of  this theoretical gesture, and 
highlight the added value of  framing food systems reforms through 
the political economy lens in Section 3. I then identify three major 
challenges the political economy approach faces today, which may be 
part of  its next research agenda. These are how to understand the 
relationships between the different elements of  the food systems – their 
technological, economic, cultural, and political components – in order 
to ensure the deep transformation of  the food system that the current 
situation requires (Section 4); how to conceptualise power in food chains 
(Section 5); and how to design transitional governance so that changes 
can take place, in a coordinated and mutually supportive fashion, 
at different levels of  governance, from the local to the international 
(Section 6). I conclude briefly in Section 7.
2 What is the political economy approach?
The political economy approach to food systems can best be understood 
in contrast to the approaches that currently still dominate the literature 
on how to address the challenges of  hunger and malnutrition. In 
part because of  its dependence on natural resources and on weather-
related events, food production has often been approached with 
14 | De Schutter The Political Economy Approach to Food Systems Reform
Vol. 50 No. 2 July 2019 ‘The Political Economy of Food’
the tools of  the natural sciences, agronomy in particular; even the 
(now more fashionable) Earth systems approach has maintained 
that close connection between food production and the sciences of  
nature (National Research Council 1988; The Global Environmental 
Change Programmes 2001; Billen, Lassaletta and Garnier 2014). 
Similarly, food consumption has largely been treated in relation to the 
physiological needs of  individuals, rather than related to how tastes are 
shaped by advertising, social norms and habits, and the pressures of  
contemporary life.
Such approaches to food systems see the challenge primarily in 
quantitative terms. Even where they aim to incorporate a concern 
for food access for the poor, beyond the immediate concern for 
food availability, their chief  concern remains to ensure that supply 
matches demand in order to keep prices within certain margins, thus 
depoliticising the debate about reform.
In contrast, the political economy approach to food systems denaturalises 
and politicises the question of  food systems reform. The entitlements 
approach pioneered by Amartya Sen (1981) represented an important 
step in this direction, since it sought to move beyond the naive view 
according to which hunger and malnutrition are exclusively or 
primarily about increasing production. The political economy approach 
radicalises this initial shift. Not only does it move away from a focus on 
production and on satisfying the physiological needs of  the individual, 
as if  these were merely technical problems which the prowesses of  
technology could adequately address, but it also challenges the usual 
assumptions about the formation of  prices reflecting the intersection 
between supply and demand.
At the macro level, in contrast to this tenet of  classical economics, the 
political economy approach insists that prices really reflect the exchange 
value of  commodities as determined by the purchasing power of  the 
richest groups of  the population (rather than the use value, reflecting 
how food satisfies the basic needs of  the poor). At the micro level, at 
the different segments of  the food chain, it notes that prices reflect the 
bargaining power of  the actors involved, as defined by the range of  
options at their disposal. But these perspectives about price formation 
and the meaning of  value are generally ignored in studies that see price 
variations as reflecting scarcity, or has having their source in the skies or 
in the soils: it is against this depoliticisation that the political economy 
approach is launched.
A political economy approach to food systems thus moves away both 
from descriptions that focus on the biogeochemical flows involved in 
the production, trade, and consumption of  food, and from economic 
models focused on variations of  supply and demand as they are linked 
by prices. Both these classic approaches to food systems are silent about 
the question of  agency. They portray systems without actors; they see 
food chains without power; and they take the institutional framework 
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as given, rather than as constructed and as the result of  particular path 
dependencies or conflicts.
In contrast, actors, power relationships between actors, and the 
institutional framework within which actors operate and through which 
they interact, are central to a political economy approach. Such an 
approach starts by moving from the impacts (impacts of  food systems, 
for instance, on soil management or climate change, on the health of  
the population, or on rural development) to the causes. It asks which 
policy or set of  policies, adopted by which actors, may be responsible 
for the impacts. In that regard, the démarche of  the political economy 
approach is very similar to that which is encouraged by the use of  a 
human rights framework: that framework too insists on empowerment, 
participation, and accountability in food systems reform, encouraging 
states to adopt legislative or policy frameworks to introduce elements 
of  food democracy and to involve civil society groups in the design and 
implementation of  food policies (De Schutter 2014a).
3 The added value of the political economy approach
In part, the rise of  the political economy approach to food systems is the 
result of  the failure of  the other explanatory frameworks to provide an 
adequate diagnosis of  how to address the challenges food systems face. 
In the post-Second World War era, food insecurity was framed as having 
its source in a failure of  agricultural productivity to match population 
growth and the increased demand resulting from urbanisation and 
associated shifts in diets (De Schutter 2011a, 2017). Such framing 
thus saw increased levels of  production and the growth of  agricultural 
productivity as the key challenges to be met: this explains the focus on 
mechanisation, on large-scale irrigation, on the use of  new (so-called 
‘high-yielding’ or ‘improved’) plant varieties, and on the intensive use 
of  external inputs (pesticides of  course, made even more necessary after 
monocultures became the norm, but also nitrogen-based fertilisers).
Driven by such technological advances conveniently summarised under 
the ‘green revolution’ label, the amount of  calories per capita on a 
global scale has been impressive since the start of  industrial agriculture 
in the 1920s in rich countries, and in the 1960s in most of  the 
developing world (Everson and Gollin 2003). Yet, these advances have 
proven insufficient to eradicate hunger: the absolute number of  hungry 
people has remained more or less stable throughout the years, although 
the relative number may have declined. Indeed, the 2017 State of  
Food Security and Nutrition in the World report alerted the world that 
2016 saw the first increase in the number of  hungry people in a decade 
(though largely as a result of  conflicts and climate change-related 
weather events) (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO 2017).
Even where food intake is sufficient, moreover, inadequate diets 
can result in micronutrient deficiencies such as a lack of  iodine, of  
vitamin A, or of  iron. Globally, over 165 million children are stunted – 
so malnourished that they do not reach their full physical and cognitive 
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potential – and 2 billion people globally lack vitamins and minerals 
essential for good health (De Schutter 2014b). In the 1990s, it is this 
failure of  the green revolution that led organisations working on 
children, particularly the United Nations Fund for Children (UNICEF), 
to highlight the importance of  adequate caring and feeding practices for 
the utilisation of  the food consumed (its absorption by the body). Health 
and nutritional outcomes, these organisations came to realise, depend 
as much on child caring (including breastfeeding, adequate storage 
and preparation of  food, and hygiene practices) as on food intake, and 
therefore a decisive factor in adequate nutrition is ‘the provision in the 
household and the community of  time, attention, and support to meet 
the physical, mental and social needs of  the growing child and other 
family members’ (Gillespie and Mason 1991; see also Longhurst and 
Tomkins 1995; and Haddad and Oshaug 1998).
Moreover, beyond the immediate causes of  malnutrition, these 
organisations insisted on its underlying causes (at the household level) 
and on its basic causes (at the societal level): only by examining intra-
household relationships and the choices made by the community was 
it possible to understand why, in a world of  plenty, children continued 
to starve, or to have their development stunted (UNICEF 1998; Smith 
et al. 2003). Together with Sen’s entitlements framework, this attempt to 
work on the underlying and basic causes of  malnutrition was a major 
contribution to the rise of  the political economy approach to food 
systems reform, in particular because it forced observers to question the 
institutional frameworks in which such systems are embedded.
While its successes in the eradication of  hunger and malnutrition 
were mixed, ‘green revolution’ approaches have also caused 
severe environmental impacts, leading to the pollution of  soils and 
groundwater, the erosion of  biodiversity, and the growth of  greenhouse 
gas emissions due to a loss of  carbon content of  the soil: though Rachel 
Carson had already cautioned against such impacts in the early 1960s 
(Carson 1962), it is only in recent years that these trends – that threaten 
the very resource base on which we rely for our food, including the 
natural fertility of  soils – have been taken seriously. The green revolution 
also encouraged dietary transitions that reduced diversity for many 
groups of  the population, leading to the growth of  non-communicable 
diseases such as type 2 diabetes, heart diseases, and gastro-intestinal 
cancers linked to poor diets (WHO 2016; Swinburn et al. 2019).
Perhaps the most disturbing failure of  green revolution approaches 
is that they have failed to reduce rural poverty, instead encouraging 
growth of  inequalities and agrarian concentration in rural areas 
(Griffin 1974; Stein 2010). Indeed, with the benefit of  hindsight, it 
now appears that, far from being scale-neutral, the green revolution 
technologies favoured farmers who had enough land to make it worth 
investing in the acquisition of  machinery and irrigation systems; who 
had access to capital, allowing them to buy the external inputs required 
to ‘benefit’ from the introduction of  modern technologies in agriculture; 
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and who had access to markets and long supply chains, allowing them 
to specialise into certain monocultures and to meet the expectations of  
major buyers of  raw agricultural commodities.
As a result of  the increases in production, the price of  food could be 
kept down despite the substantial increase in demand. But some groups 
of  food producers lost. Small-scale farmers generally were pushed out 
from farming, or (in poor countries) relegated to a form of  subsistance 
agriculture because, under existing market conditions, and due to the 
last of  the investment in the public goods that would have supported 
them, they are less competitive and unable to achieve economies of  
scale (Griffin 1974; Freebairn 1995; Stein 2010). In many developing 
countries, moreover, farmers with no title to the land they cultivated 
were unable to have access to credit, since they could not mortgage the 
land: they lost out, and women were disproportionately affected.
In the mid-nineties of  the past century, the rise of  food sovereignty 
as an alternative paradigm for agricultural development and food 
systems reform provided an opportunity to reverse these trends. Food 
sovereignty was initially invoked by the transnational movement of  
small-scale farmers, the Vía Campesina; but starting with the World 
Food Summit convened in Rome in 1996, it soon became a claim of  
a large range of  social movements, who were opposed to the pressures 
resulting from the liberalisation of  trade in agricultural products and 
from the globalisation of  supply chains (Claeys 2012, 2014; and on the 
emergence of  the Vía Campesina, Desmarais 2007).
Although the rise of  food sovereignty during the past 20 years has faced 
strong resistance, it has offered a powerful counter-narrative to the 
mainstream discourse about food systems and how to improve them. 
It has moved the debate from the chiefly technical question of  how to 
pursue the growth of  agricultural productivity, to the political economy 
questions of  who controls food systems, who benefits from the current 
organisation of  food systems, and what are the obstacles to change. 
The following sections discuss three major lock-ins highlighted by the 
discussion launched since the rise of  the claim to food sovereignty.
4 Co-evolution and resistance to change
A first insight from the political economy approach is a diagnosis about 
the source of  the inertia of  dominant food systems. The mainstream 
food systems, it argues, is the result of  the co-evolution of  a number of  
elements, that – because they are the product of  a shared history and 
fit under the same dominant narrative – perfectly fit with one another 
and have become mutually supportive (Shove 2003; Shove and Walker 
2007). The storage, processing, and communications infrastructures 
that have developed have supported primarily the production of  major 
commodities, meant as inputs for the food manufacturing industry and 
large domestic markets or export markets; research and development of  
new plant varieties focused on a limited number of  crops, such as maize, 
soybean, rice, and potato, while many other plants (particularly food 
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plants cultivated for local consumption by farmers in the global South) 
were comparatively neglected (IPES-Food 2016).
These socio-technological choices in fact favoured large economic 
actors, the largest farms, and the big transnational agri-food 
corporations in particular, which were best equipped to achieve the 
economics of  scale made possible by the expansion and globalisation 
of  markets. It is these actors which benefited the most from agricultural 
policies, including the Common Agricultural Policy in the European 
Union, which grant subsidies on the basis of  the volumes produced or 
later, with the ‘decoupling’ of  subsidies to avoid distorting production, 
on the basis of  the surface owned (IPES-Food 2019). Big commodity 
buyers and food manufacturing companies were ideally placed to 
pit farmers against farmers, as their foodshed (the range of  suppliers 
they source from) expanded, and to impose on farmers compliance 
with certain standards that made it even more difficult for small-scale 
producers to compete. As economic globalisation was deepened by the 
lowering of  barriers to trade in agricultural products, investments in 
research and development and in infrastructure were increasingly made 
in the interest of  export-led agriculture. This primarily benefited the 
largest agri-food corporations controlling global supply chains, which 
gradually were able to strengthen their dominant position by network 
effects, by standard-setting, and by their ability to control the logistics of  
supply chains (Naseem, Spielman and Omamo 2010). In contrast, the 
needs of  small-scale farmers, producing food crops to feed their own 
communities or to serve local markets, have been largely neglected. This 
concerns the development of  new plant varieties, in which rewarding 
private plant breeders by strengthening intellectual property rights 
regimes has largely become a substitute for the funding of  public 
research centres (De Schutter 2011b; Howard 2015). But it also relates 
to the building of  communication and storage facilities, to agricultural 
machinery, or to the dissemination of  agricultural knowledge by 
extension services.
The mass production of  refined grains and of  processed foods allowed 
by these developments fits perfectly well with lifestyle changes, and 
the new appetite of  consumers for foods that are tasty and easy to 
prepare, although they are often also the least nutritious and the 
least healthy – since there is typically a tradeoff between the length 
of  shelf  life and the distance travelled by foods and their nutritional 
qualities. Finally, because the large food manufacturers and retailers, 
with their superior logistical networks and their ability to pay less at 
all segments of  the food chain, can produce foods at a low price for 
consumers, they can relatively easily capture political influence, since 
they promise ‘solutions’ that allow politicians to ignore demands for 
stronger social justice: in practice, cheap food worked as a substitute 
for welfare policies that would have made quality diets affordable for 
all households. Of  course, this ‘cheapness’ is in fact largely based on an 
illusion: the real costs of  food production are shifted onto the taxpayers 
paying for the agricultural subsidies and to the next generation which 
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shall pay for the mounting health-care costs linked to poor diets and for 
the environmental damage caused by industrial agriculture. But most 
governments, until now, have been too short-sighted, or perhaps too 
captive, to have an interest in dispelling the illusion.
This is how, in the mainstream food regime, technological choices 
combine with economic choices and cultural evolutions strengthen the 
dominance of  the largest actors, allowing them to capture the political 
process. These actors promise to produce at a low price to consumers, 
thanks to the economies of  scale they can achieve, the strong bargaining 
power they have vis-à-vis suppliers and agricultural raw materials, and 
their superior logistics: for governments, to support these actors is to 
support mass consumption, and thus to alleviate the impacts of  growing 
inequalities and poverty.
What is most striking in a system resulting from such co-evolutions, 
is that, considered in isolation, each component of  the system can be 
perceived as legitimate, even though the system as a whole is perceived 
as unsustainable: indeed, technological choices, the weight of  the largest 
actors, food culture, and even the policymaking, can all be defended on 
the basis that they are the best adapted to the system as it has evolved. 
In Darwinian terms, one would speak of  the survival of  the fittest: the 
fittest technologies, the fittest companies, the fittest culinary cultures, 
the fittest political system – the fittest, in all these examples, to the 
objective of  increasing calorie availability per capita and keeping prices 
for consumers down.
It has become a cliché in recent literature in food systems to refer to the 
‘consumerist turn’: consumers henceforth, we are told, would be driving 
the system ‘fork to farm’, influencing the practices of  retailers and 
producers rather than being shaped by them (Spaargaren, Oosteveer 
and Loeber 2012: 18–19). But the reality is both more depressing and 
more complex: since eating habits and culinary practices are shaped 
by the foods that are on offer, in addition to the other components of  
the food environments – from advertising to working times and from 
social norms to the organisation of  space – we are caught, rather, in 
a cycle in which such habits and practices cannot change without the 
whole system changing. The problem is systemic, the political economy 
approach argues: so should be the solutions.
5 The measure of power in food chains
The political economy approach to food systems insists on the need to 
address power in food chains. This is in part because of  a basic concern 
with equity: since small-scale farmers are gradually being squeezed out 
of  business in rich countries, and constitute a large proportion, perhaps 
even a majority, of  the hungry in the global South, strengthening their 
position in food chains would make a significant contribution to the 
ability of  peasant agriculture to develop, as well as to the reduction of  
rural poverty. But addressing the question of  power in food chains is 
not simply a matter of  protecting the weakest party in the relationships 
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between the different actors of  food systems; it also is in the general 
interest. A significant portion of  the waste in food chains, for instance, 
has its source in the practices of  supermarkets and food manufacturers 
towards their suppliers, whether these buyers encourage overproduction 
before deciding, at the last minute, that they will not need to order all 
the food that has been prepared for them, or whether they reject some 
produce on purely cosmetic grounds, or because it is nearing its sell-by 
date (Stuart 2009, chapters 2 and 3).
It is also power in food chains, and our failure to address it, that 
explains how the growth of  private standards in global supply chains 
disproportionately affected small-scale food producers: while motivated 
initially by the need to reassure consumers about the safety of  their food 
and about the environmental sustainability of  how it is produced, and 
while allowing certain efficiency gains, the setting of  private standards 
by the dominant players in the agri-food systems has had exclusionary 
effects on smallholders, whose specific constraints have not been 
considered in the establishment of  such regimes, and who are provided 
no avenue to complain (Dolan and Humphrey 2004; Maertens and 
Swinnen 2009; Boro de Batisti, MacGregor and Graffham 2009).
So, power in food chains must be addressed. But such power is difficult 
to conceptualise, let alone to measure. This difficulty may be another 
reason why it is difficult to tackle: in the absence of  an objective 
measure of  power, any attempt to make food chains more equitable will 
inevitably be denounced as ideologically biased, as if  the existing status 
quo were by definition less suspect.
A common way to define power in food chains is by referring to the 
concentration rate (CR) at any particular segment of  the chain in any 
particular chain. For instance, in a background document titled The Food 
Supply Chain published in 2017, the European Commission notes that,
concentration in the food processing industry and retail sectors is 
much higher than in the agricultural sector. The market share of  the 
top five firms (or C5 concentration ratio) in the EU food industry was 
at an average of  56% in 2012 in 14 of  the EU’s Member States. At 
the same time, in 13 Member States the share of  the top five retailers 
exceeded 60% (European Commission 2017: 2).
The implication of  such a finding is that the suppliers of  raw 
agricultural materials (the farmers) are at a disadvantage in negotiating 
with the commodity buyers and the retailers, since the latter are far 
more concentrated than farmers are, and thus have a much greater 
ability to coerce farmers into making certain concessions or into 
accepting certain conditions. Indeed, the document was prepared 
in part in order to provide background explaining the proposal 
of  the Commission for a Directive on unfair trading practices in 
business-to-business relationships in the food supply chain (European 
Commission 2018).
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It is this classic measure of  power that is used in the visual representations 
of  food chains, which the fair trade movement made popular, presenting 
such food chains as having an hourglass shape: a very large number 
of  farmers, a relatively small number of  commodity buyers, food 
manufacturers, and retailers, and a very large number of  end consumers. 
(In fact, such models now increasingly include, at the top of  the figure, 
the increasingly concentrated input providers – seed and agrochemical 
companies, which are now forming a single sector following a range 
of  mergers and acquisitions.) This seems a convenient way of  defining 
power, and it lends itself  well to such visualisation exercises. Such a 
representation is misleading, however, and the attempt to measure 
bargaining power as derived from the CR in particular segments of  the 
food chain is a gross oversimplification for a number of  reasons.
First, such a measure is insufficiently precise to capture the various 
forms of  relationship between suppliers and buyers along the chain. 
Yet, these relationships are extremely varied, between the extremes of  
vertical integration (in which the buyer totally controls the upstream 
segment) and of  relationships as they may develop on the spot market, 
in the absence of  any long-term contractual agreement between buyer 
and seller.
Second, how much bargaining power any single actor has also depends 
on a range of  variables that cannot be captured by the CR alone. 
Consider, for instance, the relationships between the producer (the 
farmer) and the buyer of  raw products. At the microeconomic level, 
what matters is whether any particular farmer has access to storage 
facilities (and thus may choose when to sell), or to local processing 
plants; whether she has the means to transport her produce to the 
city, or depends instead on a middleman (the ‘aggregator’, as such 
an intermediary is called in India) to that end; whether she joined a 
cooperative; whether she receives reliable information about market 
prices, and so forth. None of  these elements are captured in a simple 
quantitative measure of  the CR at different segments of  the food chain.
Third, the strength of  the bargaining positions of  different actors at any 
particular segment of  the chain depends not only on the concentration 
rates at the segments to which each actor belongs, but also on the 
shape of  the downstream market. For instance, if  a particular buyer 
has achieved a quasi-monopsonistic position in the market (i.e. for the 
seller concerned, there is in practice no other buyer he can turn to), 
the bargaining position of  that monopsonistic buyer shall of  course be 
particularly strong. The risks of  that power being abused are far more 
significant, however; not if  the buyer’s dominant position vis-à-vis the 
seller is combined with a monopolistic or dominant position of  the same 
buyer downstream, but instead if  the buyer faces strong competition in 
the downstream market. Perhaps paradoxically, the more any particular 
player is in a dominant position not only as a buyer but also as a seller 
on the downstream market, the more his dominant position vis-à-vis the 
producer whom he sources from shall be compensated by the absence 
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of  competition that he faces, as a supplier of  the downstream market. 
The reason for this is simple: if  the buyer faces strong competition on 
the downstream market, he cannot easily afford to make concessions 
to the supplier, since he may then lose out to his competitors. If, on the 
contrary, he faces no such competition, he can treat the suppliers more 
equitably, without having to fear that this may result in market losses 
downstream, because of  the slight increase in prices that this may cause.
Fourth and finally, it is not only actual competition (as measured by the 
CR), but also virtual competition, that matters: any buyer will be hesitant 
to abuse his dominant position as buyer if  he fears that new actors may 
enter the market, proposing more favourable conditions to the suppliers. 
Fair buying practices buy the loyalty of  the suppliers, minimise 
temptations of  side-selling, and make it less likely that competitors 
shall enter the market and seek to divert the suppliers into alternative 
supply chains.
These various sources of  complexity make it very difficult to measure 
power in food chains: whereas unfair trading practices can be listed and 
prohibited, ensuring complete ‘fairness’ in the bargaining process is an 
infinite task. Indeed, in negotiations, each party per definition seeks to 
impose its terms on the other, and the strength of  each party’s position 
shall depend on the range of  alternative choices that party has. Power 
is ubiquitous: it is what bargaining is all about. The fact that there is no 
agreement as to how it should be measured, however, and that classic 
measures are deeply unsatisfactory, is a major obstacle to ensuring 
equity in food chains.
6 Multi-level governance
A final obstacle to effectuating change in food systems is that such 
systems typically are influenced by actions taken at different levels of  
governance, from the private governance by retailers imposing their own 
standards on suppliers (Backer 2007) to the international agencies such 
as the World Trade Organization promoting the growth of  global trade 
and the adoption of  global regulatory standards facilitating such trade, 
and including municipal/local levels of  government, regions, and states.
The allocation of  competences across these different layers of  power 
varies of  course, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, although some 
regularities may probably be found across most world regions – for 
instance, public schools and the associated purchasing policies generally 
fall under the remit of  local authorities, whereas the setting and 
enforcement of  food safety standards are generally left to the national 
government, often in accordance with international guidelines. Land 
zoning is typically done at the local or regional level, but support to 
farmers generally depends on the national level. The trend towards 
decentralisation on the one hand, and delegation of  powers to 
international organisations on the other hand, nevertheless appears to 
be a general phenomenon: states are being emptied out. Dona Freeman 
describes as ‘de-democratisation’ the current process in which central 
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states delegate more powers to local authorities, privatise a number of  
services or standard-setting functions to corporate actors, and submit to 
disciplines in joining international regimes (Freeman 2017).
The impacts on food systems reforms are deeply ambiguous. On the 
one hand, the triple ‘de-democratisation’ we currently see occurring 
may reduce the risk of  power being abused by the central government, 
since such processes in effect disempower the state – therefore also 
making it more difficult for certain interest groups to capture the state 
for their own benefit. On the other hand, however, this fragmentation 
of  power makes it more difficult to achieve reform, since any attempt 
at reform at one level of  government may be obstructed (whether 
prohibited or discouraged) by the other levels.
7 Conclusion
There exists a long and respectable tradition of  political economy 
approaches to agricultural development. Over a span of  about 
30 years, for instance, Robert Bates and colleagues with whom he 
teamed documented the perverse role of  governments in African 
agriculture, basically robbing farmers from the product of  their work 
and exploiting them shamelessly in order to feed growing cities, or to 
export commodities on global markets in order to have access to hard 
currencies (Bates 1981, 2005; Azam, Bates and Biais 2009). In the 
same vein, Michael Lipton famously denounced the ‘urban bias’: the 
tendency of  governments to favour the urban populations, on which 
their political stability depends, at the expense of  the livelihoods of  the 
rural dwellers – who, because they are often poorly educated and spread 
over large territories, often find it difficult to be organised (Lipton 1977). 
Contrasting the situation in Africa with that of  South Asia, Birner and 
Resnick discussed in minute detail the essential role governments played 
in the successes of  the ‘first’ green revolution, in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Birner and Resnick 2010).
Power, however, does not reside only with governments; it is pervasive 
within food systems, and it is perhaps private power that now deserves 
the greatest attention, because it lacks any accountability. The 
challenge of  the political economy to food systems is to address private 
government: the unchecked power of  incumbents in mainstream 
food systems, who oppose all change, and have managed to translate 
their economic dominance into political influence. This requires that 
we reassert the duty of  states to control the dominant actors of  the 
agri-food system, but that we also insist on democratising the state to 
make it fully accountable to the population groups that the mainstream 
food systems have marginalised. This new phase is only just beginning.
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Notes
*  Funding for this IDS Bulletin was provided by IPES-Food in 
furtherance of  their aim to apply a political economy approach in 
understanding and reforming food systems.
   This IDS Bulletin represents a collaboration between IDS and 
IPES-Food. Both organisations are committed to holistic, sustainable, 
democratic approaches to improving food systems, and to applying 
excellent research and political economy approaches in working 
towards these goals. We hope this IDS Bulletin represents the breadth 
of  debate at the 2018 workshop we co-sponsored, on ‘Political 
Economies of  Sustainable Food Systems: Critical Approaches, 
Agendas and Challenges’, and that it contributes to the sharing of  
knowledge in the name of  sustainable and equitable food systems.
1 Olivier De Schutter, Co-chair of  the International Panel of  Experts 
on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES-Food) and a member of  the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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